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THE LOANED SERVANT DOCTRINE IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the law of master and servant, the question of who shall
bear the vicarious responsibility for the negligence of a "loaned" or
"borrowed" servant has proven to be not only one of the most diffi-
cult, but also one of the most litigated problems.' This combination
of difficult and frequent litigation has given rise to a situation in
which there appears to be little consistency in the decisions, either
generally or within a given jurisdiction.' While two major tests have
evolved for resolving the issue of which of two employers will be liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the standards to be used
in applying either of the tests are fraught with ambiguity. In large
part, this ambiguity can be traced to a failure to recognize the pur-
pose of the doctrine.
The law of Ohio is no exception to this problem. Ohio courts
have applied both the "control" test and the "whose business" test
in attempting to fix vicarious liability in the loaned servant situation,
but have been hampered by a failure to perceive consistently and
correctly the goal of the doctrine and by an absence of clearly defined
standards to be used in applying either of the tests. These cases will
be reviewed in an attempt not only to examine what standards have
been applied, but also to suggest what the standard ought to be.
Before embarking on this mission into the "wilderness, ' 3 however,
the setting in which the problem arises and the effect the application
of the doctrine should bring about will be briefly discussed.
II. THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE
The factual setting that invites application of the loaned servant
doctrine is a common one: an employer finds himself short of workers
for a particular undertaking and borrows employees from another
business to fill his manpower requirements. Often, the borrowed em-
ployees have special skills needed by the borrowing employer to com-
plete the task in question4 and this borrowing of employees may be
P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 309 (4th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as MECHEM].
2 Borrowed Servants, 76 COM. L.J. 307 (1971). Cardozo once described the state of the
law in this area as "chaotic." Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 121
(1921).
' Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
1232 (1940).
1 See, e.g., McAndrews v. E. W. Bliss Co., 186 F.2d 499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
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incidental to the borrowing or leasing of equipment needed for the
job.S It is not unusual, however, for general labor to be borrowed. 6
As in all employment relationships, consent of the parties involved
in the loan - lending employer, borrowing employer,7 and employee
- is a prerequisite.8 Such consent may be either express or implied.'
The loaned servant problem does not arise where the work done
by the employee is pursuant to a joint venture by two employers, 10
or when the task is pursuant to the instructions of both employers and
yields separate and equally direct benefits to each." In the case of a
worker who is referred to various employers needing temporary help
and who will pay the worker's salary, should both worker and em-
ployer agree to the hiring, there is no need to apply the loaned servant
doctrine. In such a case, the referral service would be an agent of the
worker, not his master.'2 Since the referral service would not be
subjected to vicarious liability, the situation is not one in which a
choice must be made between vicariously liable employers. The
loaned servant question does arise where an employer pays the
worker's salary and is in the business of hiring him out to others in
need of temporary help. 3
The loaned servant doctrine generally will not affect other as-
pects of the employment relationship; it governs only the allocation
of vicarious tort liability between employers. 4 Therefore, broad pow-
ers may be retained by the general employer during the period of the
loan without affecting the worker's status as a loaned employee. The
821 (1951); Halkias v. Wilkoff Co., 141 Ohio St. 139, 47 N.E.2d 199 (1943); Redmond v.
Republic Steel Corp., 102 Ohio App. 163, 131 N.E.2d 593 (1956).
5 See, e.g., Bobik v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946); Scharf
v. Gardner Cartage Co., 95 Ohio App. 153, 113 N.E.2d 717 (1953). This situation raises special
problems when the "control" test is used. See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 infra.
I See, e.g., Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St.2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965); Giovinale
v. Republic Steel Corp., 151 Ohio St. 161, 84 N.E.2d 904 (1949).
1 The cases and literature tend to use the terms "general employer" and "special em-
ployer" respectively. "Long-term employer" and "short-term employer" have also found wide
use.
8MECHEM, supra note 1, at 11; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1958).
1 Mayflower Ins. Co. v. Star Block & Builders Supply Co., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 297, 170
N.E.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1959).
" This would result in dual liability. MECHEM, supra note 1, at 310.
" Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958). This also would result in dual
liability, should such a case ever arise.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
'3 Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, 92, 206 N.E.2d 554, 556 (1965).
, See, e.g., Kant Slip Federal Credit Union v. Dudley, 9 Ohio Misc. 123, 223 N.E.2d 912
(C.P. 1965), affd, 9 Ohio St. 2d 135, 224 N.E.2d 341 (1967), which held that the loaned servant
status of credit union employees did not control which employer was to pay unemployment
compensation.
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cases, in Ohio and generally, seem to attach little significance to the
fact that wages continue to be paid by the general employer. 5 Like-
wise, the general employer's retention of the ultimate power to dis-
charge the employee has not been held to be crucial to the loaned
servant question."6 In this respect, both the general and the special
employer have been said to be masters of the employee.17 As to either
employer, the employee in question is a "person employed to perform
service for another in his affairs and who with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the service is subject to the other's
control or right of control."'" As Professor Mechem has pointed out,
while the employee performs a specific task under the direction of the
special employer, he does so for the ultimate benefit of his general
employer" and is always subject to the general employer's ultimate
control."0 It is the presence of two concurrent masters that gives rise
to the problem dealt with by the loaned servant doctrine.
Because there are two masters, the loaned servant doctrine ought
not be used to determine which is the "true" master. Indeed, a strict
application of respondeat superior would hold both employers vicari-
ously liable.2 Rather, the proper role of the doctrine is that of a
mechanism for choosing the better risk bearer or loss distributor. In
this respect, the doctrine operates as an extension of respondeat supe-
rior, not as a substitute for it. When respondeat superior indicates
two possible risk bearers or loss distributors, the loaned servant doc-
11 See Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 225 (1909); Daniels v. MacGregor
Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965); Bobik v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 187,
64 N.E.2d 829 (1946); Scharf v. Gardner Cartage Co., 95 Ohio App. 153, 113 N.E.2d 717
(1953). But see Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio St. 177, 165 N.E. 721 (1929). As the cases indicate,
the general employer is usually reimbursed for these wages by the special employer.
" See authorities cited in note 15, supra.
'7 The classic statement of this dual master relationship is that of Lord Cockburn in
Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., 2 C.P.D. 205, 209 (1877):
But when one person lends his servant to another for a particular employment, the
servant for anything done in that particular employment must be dealt with as the
servant of the man to whom he is lent, although he remains the general servant of
the person who lent him.
But cf. Atwood v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 72 F. 447, 455 (C.C. Mo. 1896):
It is a doctrine as old as the Bible itself, and the common law of the land follows it,
that a man cannot serve two masters at the same time; he will obey the one and
betray the other. He cannot be subject to two controlling forces which may be at
the time divergent.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958).
" MECHEM, supra note 1, at 315.
21Id. at 314. See Borrowed Servants, supra note 2, at 310.
" This is basically the approach taken in Pennsylvania. When dual masters are found for
a single employee, the masters have joint vicarious liability for his negligence. See generally
MECHEM, supra note 1, at 311-13; Borrowed Servants, supra note 2, at 317.
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trine indicates which of these candidates will better serve to promote
the policies underlying respondeat superior.
Viewing the loaned servant doctrine as an extension of respon-
deat superior is consistent with each of the rationales advanced for
the rule of respondeat superior. If, for example, vicarious liability
under respondeat superior is based on the employer's ability to pre-
vent injuries by controlling the conduct of the employee, the loaned
servant doctrine would fix liability on the one who had sufficient
control to have prevented the loss, even though the other might have
had a lesser degree of control.2 Similarly, if vicarious liability has as
its goal the deterrence of undesirable conduct, it should be placed on
the employer who could have best affected a change in that con-
duct, 3 even though others might also have been able to do so.
It is under the "entrepreneur" theory of vicarious liability that
the loaned servant doctrine's role in choosing a loss distributor is best
brought into focus. Under this theory of respondeat superior, it is
posited that incidental losses occur in fulfilling the needs of society
through commerce and that these losses are passed on to society as
a part of the cost of the benefits it receives from that commerce.
When several enterprises are involved in a particular loss, the loss
bearer ought to be that enterprise which can most efficiently distrib-
ute that loss to society.24 When translated into loaned servant terms,
the problem of efficient loss distribution becomes which of two em-
ployers is best situated to absorb the cost of the employee's negli-
gence and pass it on via the price structure.25
In short, the function of the loaned servant doctrine is to deter-
mine on which of two employers society wishes to place the burden
of vicarious liability.26 If this function is to be performed properly, it
is imperative that the courts recognize that there are two masters, one
of which will be the better loss distributor. On occasion, the Ohio
courts have been influenced by this principle. In Scharf v. Gardner
Cartage Co., the court of appeals, finding that the employees in
question were loaned servants, stated that "such servants must be
21 See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra; see also discussion at III.A. infra.
= Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 116 (1916).
24 Id., at 112, 127; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALE
L.J. 584, 599-604 (1929); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 CoLuM. L. REV. 444, 456-60 (1923).
21 Cf. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961). Calabresi's hypothesis - that enterprise liability promotes proper resource alloca-
tion by causing the price to reflect the true cost of the product - may not be strictly applicable
in the area of loaned servants, in that the liability of a particular employer may not be fixed
until after the pricing decision has been made.
28 Borrowed Servants, supra note 2, at 313, 318.
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regarded as servants of the party to whom they are loaned, even
though they remain in the general employ of the supplier." 27 Simi-
larly, the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, in Kant Slip
Federal Credit Union v. Dudley, recognized the ongoing relationship
of the employee with the general employer, despite the possibility of
vicarious liability of a special employer:
Under such a factual situation, however, the obligation of the gen-
eral employer to pay the wages to such employee continues, and the
general relationship of employer-employee between the general
employer and the employee continues."
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently approved.
the common pleas court's reasoning in Kant Slip,29 it has never ex-
plicitly subscribed to the dual master theory. At most, its adherence
to the concept of two coexisting masters can only be inferred from
the cases before it. In Babbitt v. Say,3" for instance, the court appar-
ently recognized that the real contest over liability was between the
owner and the hirer of a truck accompanied by a driver, not between
the hirer and the driver employee. In Daniels v. MacGregor Co.3
the court came close to declaring its allegiance to the dual master
concept. In finding that the employee of a "temporary help" business
was also the employee of the customer of that business when the
employee was hired out to the customer, the court consistently re-
ferred to the general employer as "employer" and the special em-
ployer as "customer." This language implies that the special em-
ployer status of the customer did not affect the employer status of
the general employer.
On the other hand, the Ohio Supreme Court may have rejected
the dual master approach. In at least two cases coming from that
bench, the concern seems to be more with finding a single employer
than with finding the better loss distributor. In Halkias v. Wilkoff
Co.,32 Ferrara, a general employee of Wilkoff, operated a crane to
move earth for the Joyce Company under the direction of Joyce's
foreman. Whenthe crane moved, Halkias, an employee of a painting
firm, was injured. In considering whether Wilkoff or Joyce should be
vicariously liable for Halkias' injuries, Justice Hart stated that it was
95 Ohio App. 153, 159, 113 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1953).
z' 9 Ohio Misc. 123, 128, 223 N.E.2d 912, 917 (C.P. 1965).
Kant Slip Federal Credit Union v. Dudley, 9 Ohio St. 2d 135, 224 N.E.2d 341 (1967).
120 Ohio St. 177, 165 N.E. 721 (1929).
3' 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965).
"1 141 Ohio St. 139, 47 N.E.2d 199 (1943).
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"not important whether he [Ferrara] remain[ed] the servant of the
general employer as to matters generally."3 3 However, if Wilkoff
were the better loss distributor, it would indeed be important to
recognize its liability as the general employer of the negligent crane-
man. In Babbitt v. Say, despite the general recognition of a contest
for vicarious liability between owner and hirer, the court spoke of the
necessity of finding "exclusive control" in the hirer as a prerequisite
to the hirer's vicarious liability, thereby implying that the owner's
control must be so removed that he could not be a master as well.34
While the discussion of the loaned servant doctrine in Halkias
is dictum,3 it is nonetheless the most definite statement concerning
the dual master theory to come from the state's highest court. Moreo-
ver, it is unclear whether either this statement or the earlier "exclu-
sive control" language of Babbitt have since been repudiated, either
by the language used in MacGregor or by the supreme court's broad
approval of the common pleas opinion in Kant Slip.
Such vacillation on a concept fundamental to the proper imple-
mentation of the policy goals of the loaned servant doctrine has had
a pragmatic consequence. Where courts have not recognized that the
doctrine contemplates the existence of two concurrent masters, the
failure to show "exclusive control," "sole direction and control,' '3
or a "change of masters" 37 has prevented the finding of a loaned
servant. However, since the purpose of the doctrine is to find the
better loss distributor rather than the "true" master, this requirement
of exclusive control is not only unnecessary, but also frustrates the
functioning of the doctrine by eliminating from consideration all but
one of the choices for loss distribution. Inconsistency in recognizing
the presence of dual masters in the loaned servant situation may be
a primary cause of the inconsistency in the results of the cases; cer-
tainly, it is more difficult to shift liability to another if it must be
shown that the other was the sole master rather than merely the more
dominant or interested of two masters.
141 Ohio St. at 152, 47 N.E.2d at 205.
' 120 Ohio St. 177, 177-78, 165 N.E. 721 (1929) (paragraph 4 of syllabus).
The ratio decidendi for relieving Wilkoff of liability was the fact that Ferarra had no
authority to operate the crane. 120 Ohio St. at 153, 47 N.E.2d at 206. Inasmuch as the Joyce
Company was not a party to the action, its liability could not be adjudicated. The status of the
loaned servant discussion as dictum was recognized in Bennett v. Wilson, .113 Ohio App. 503,
505, 179 N.E.2d 86, 87 (1961).
"' Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., 102 Ohio App. 163, 169, 131 N.E.2d 593, 597
(1956).
" Id. at 171, 131 N.E.2d at 598 (quoting from Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S.
215, 226 (1909)).
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III. TESTS USED UNDER THE DOCTRINE
A. The Control Test
The most widely used test, both in Ohio and generally, for deter-
mining which employer will bear the vicarious liability for a loaned
servant's negligence is the "control" test. Under this test, the party
having superior control over the employee's acts must also bear the
liability.3 Control, however, can be of at least two types, and courts
have not always been sure which is determinative under this test.
1. Broad Control
The first type of control is commonly referred to as "broad"
control - i.e., the power of "hiring, training, and firing."39 As has
been indicated, this broad control may be retained by the general
employer without affecting the loaned servant status of the em-
ployee.4" Thus, it is apparent that possession of broad control is not
decisive as to liability. However, the broad control retained by the
general employer might be recognized by the employee as superior
to the control possessed by the special employer, for the primary
desire of the employee is to please his long-term employer.41 If the
mental impetus of the employee were to be considered as an impor-
tant element in determining where the ultimate liability rests,4" such
superior allegiance to the long-term employer would seem to indicate
that, in a given case, he who holds the broad control ought also to
bear the liability. Such subjective considerations, however, have not
been used to date in the loaned servant area. Regardless of whether
liability hinges on who has the broad control over the employee, the
presence of broad control in the general employer does play an im-
portant role in the mechanics of the loaned servant doctrine. When
such broad control rests with the long-term employer, it raises the
presumption that the servant was not loaned and places the burden
of proof on the party asserting the liability of the special employer.
The classic statement of the presumption is that of the Judge Car-
dozo, in Charles v. Barrett:
[T]here will be no inference of a new relation unless command has
11 See Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188 (1939) for
a discussion of the role of control as a dominant factor in the law of master and servant.
" Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MicH. L. REV. 1222,
1230 (1940).
" See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
" MECHEM, supra note 1, at 314.
42 The mental impetus of the employee is an important consideration in determining the
scope of the employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (l)(c) (1958).
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been surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere
fact of its division.4 3
While the Ohio cases contain no such concise statement of this pre-
sumption, it is clear that Ohio courts recognize it. Language to the
effect that neither division of control nor cooperation alone will es-
tablish loaned servant status is found in several of the opinions,4
indicating support for the latter half of Cardozo's statement. In addi-
tion, directed verdicts at the close of the plaintiff's case, relieving the
defendant of liability on the basis of the loaned servant doctrine, have
universally been reversed, indicating that the burden of demonstrat-
ing the loaned servant relationship lies with him who seeks to take
advantage of it.45
The presumption of continuing liability of the general employer
who retains broad control is strengthened when the long-term em-
ployer has hired out both the machine owned by him and an operator-
employee of the machine." The rationale underlying this presumption
is that the employee will be more mindful of the general employer's
interest in the machine than of the orders given by the special em-
ployer. In Ohio, the presumption is somewhat more detailed than in
other jurisdictions; ownership of the machine alone will not suffice
to raise a prima facie case for the owner's liability for acts of the
operator-employee. Probably the best statement of the Ohio version
of the presumption is that contained in Halkias v. Wilkoff Co.:
This court, however, is committed to the proposition that proof
of ownership alone is not sufficient to raise such an inference of fact.
To raise such an inference of fact. To raise such an inference, it must
be shown, in addition to such ownership, not only that the operator
is an employee of the owner but that he is employed generally in
the business of his employer to operate such an instrumentality.
When such essential facts . . . are shown, an inference arises
that in operating the instrumentality at any specific time, the opera-
tor is acting within the scope of his authority, and this stands as an
item of evidence, subject to be counterbalanced or overthrown by
43 233 N.Y. 127, 129, 135 N.E. 199, 200 (1922). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 227, comment b. (1958).
" See, e.g., Bennett v. Wilson, 113 Ohio App. 503, 505, 506, 179 N.E.2d 86, 87, 88 (1961);
Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., 102 Ohio App. 163, 170-71, 131 N.E.2d 593, 598 (1956).
"1 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Grandview Cement Products, Inc., 116 Ohio App. 313, 187 N.E.2d
895 (1962); Bennett v. Wilson, 113 Ohio App. 503, 179 N.E.2d 86 (1961).
" W. SELL, AGENCY 88 (1975); J. FRASCONA, AGENCY 9 (1964); MECHEM, supra note I,
at 314-15.
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other competent evidence.47
In the usual loaned servant case, there will be no issue as to whether
operation of the machine was within the employee's scope of author-
ity; the fact that the employee accompanied the machine as the opera-
tor at his employer's request will generally suffice to establish this.
Similarly, the fact that the operator was the general employee of the
lessor will not often be contested. Therefore, unless either the scope
of authority to operate the machine or the general employment rela-
tion is challenged, the Ohio version of the presumption operates in
much the same manner as the majority version. If it is shown that
the machine is owned by the long-term employer, there will be a
presumption of that employer's continuing control over the acts of
the employee-operator.
2. Spot Control
It is the second type of control, "spot" control, that is the deci-
sive factor in the control test of liability. Spot control has been de-
fined as "the control exercised by the employer on the spot, the man
who says when and where to go and how fast.""8 An early formulation
of the control test in Ohio stated that liability would rest with the
employer who had "such. . . control over the drive that permits him
to do more than to designate what work is to be done."49 Subsequent
loaned servant cases have adopted the language used in the two lead-
ing Ohio cases governing the existence of any employer-employee
relationship. In the second paragraph of the syllabus of Gillum v.
Industrial Commission the standard was said to be "the right to
control the manner or means of doing the work."5 While in Councell
v. Douglas the applicable test was "control of, or the right to control,
the mode and manner of doing the work."5
Two things must be emphasized about the control test. First, it
is the right to exercise spot control, not the actual exercise of it, that
is determinative. Thus, it is possible to place vicarious liability on the
short-term employer even if his supervisory personnel were not di-
4 141 Ohio St. 139, 142-45, 47 N.E.2d 199, 201-03 (1943).
, Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
1230 (1940); see also Comment, The Loaned Servant Doctrine, 29 TENN. L. REV. 448 (1962).
"1 Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio St. 177, 177-78, 165 N.E. 721 (1929)(paragraph 4 of syllabus).
10 141 Ohio St. 373, 48 N.E.2d 234 (1943). The "manner or means" language appears in
a loaned servant context in Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965)
and Bobik v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946).
11 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955)(paragraph I of syllabus). The "mode and
manner" language appears in a loaned servant context in Gilmore v. Grandview Cement
Products, Inc., 116 Ohio App. 313, 187 N.E.2d 895 (1962) and Bennett v. Wilson, 113 Ohio
App. 503, 179 N.E.2d 86 (1961).
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recting the acts of the employee at the time of the injury, as long as
there was a right so to direct. An example of the significance of this
distinction is found in Bobik v. Industrial Commission.52 There, the
driver of a truck was held to be a loaned servant and the short term
employer was held liable, even though no representative of the short-
term employer was present when the injury occurred and the activities
of the driver were not pursuant to specific directions of the short-term
employer. Secondly, it appears that the control possessed by the
short-term employer must be capable of exercise to some degree of
specificity and detail in the direction of the employee. In cases using
the control test, directed verdicts for the defendants were reversed
despite the demonstration of a right of detailed control in the special
employer.53 While there are other cases in which less specific control
was sufficient to find the employee to be a loaned servant, 4 these
cases had proceeded to verdict or judgment, and the appellate courts
were therefore reluctant to dispute the factfinders' conclusions.55
Thus while the control must be specific, the degree of specificity
necessary to shift liability to the special employer will, as a practical
matter, be a function of trial strategy. In other words, evidence of
control lacking the high degree of specificity needed to support a
directed verdict may nonetheless be sufficient to support the fact-
finder's decision to impose liability on the special employer.
As is readily apparent, the demonstration that the special em-
ployer has spot control over the employee will overcome the pre-
sumption of the general employer's liability, based on his broad con-
trol of the employee. This is true even where the presumption has
been reinforced by the presence of machinery leased to the special
employer and to be operated by the employee. The more specific and
immediate control of the special employer overrides the long-term
pecuniary and proprietary interest of the general employer in the
52 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946). See also Boaz v. Ostrander, 77 Ohio L. Abs.
453, 147 N.E.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1958) where a truck driver was held to be a loaned servant even
though the special employer was on the other side of the job site talking to a neighbor at the
time of the accident.
'3 See, e.g., Sullivan v. General Electric Co., 226 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1955); New York,
C. & St.L. R.R. v. Heffner Constr. Co., 9 Ohio App.2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 649 (1967); Gilmore
v. Grandview Cement Products, Inc., 116 Ohio App. 313, 187 N.E.2d 895 (1962); Bennett v.
Wilson, 113 Ohio App. 503, 179 N.E.2d 86 (1961).
" See, e.g., Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965); Bobik
v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 87, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946); Boaz v. Ostrander, 77 Ohio L.
Abs. 453, 147 N.E.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1958). But cf. McAndrews v. E. W. Bliss Co., 186 F.2d
499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951).
11 Bank of Buffalo v. Wendel, 100 Ohio St. 47, 125 N.E. 111 (1919); Western Ohio R.R.
v. Fairburn, 99 Ohio St. 141, 124 N.E. 131 (1918).
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employee and the machinery.
Though widespread in its use, the control test does not appear
to implement efficiently the loss-distributing function of the loaned
servant doctrine. There is little reason to believe that spot control
indicates anything about the employer's capacity for absorbing the
cost of incidental losses or his ability to pass on such costs to his
cust9mers. Rather, the focus of the test of control is the same here
as it is in the master and servant area generally: to find a loss distribu-
tor, not necessarily the best loss distributor.57 Even if the dual-master
problem were overcome, the ambiguity over what is meant by "con-
trol" and what degree of that control is necessary for liability to
adhere has caused the control test to be a less than efficient loss-
distribution talisman.58
Despite its inadequacy as a guide to which of two employers is
the better loss distributor, the control test does serve to promote a
secondary goal of the loaned servant doctrine and of vicarious liabil-
ity generally. It is said that vicarious liability will promote safety, for
the person held responsible will take precautions to prevent accidents
that would give rise to liability. 9 It would seem that the employer
possessing spot control, thus having the right to engage in close and
detailed supervision, would be in a better position to take those pre-
cautions than the more remote possessor of broad control.
B. The "Whose Business" Test
Dissatisfaction with the chaotic results of the control test has led
many courts to abandon it for that reason alone," irrespective of its
lack of efficacy as a loss distributor. In its place, the determinative
question has become "whether the employee is furthering the inter-
ests of his general employer."6 Under this test, liability attaches to
the employer whose business was being done by the employee at the
time of the injury.
11 See generally Douglas, supra note 24, at 601-03; Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM.
L. REV. 444, 456-60 (1923).
5 See text supra at II; Borrowed Servants. supra note 2, at 312-13.
Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
1230-32 (1940).
' See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th ed. 1971).
o Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
1232 (1940); Douglas, supra note 24, at 603; Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV.
444, 455 (1923).
Ii See, e.g., Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1937).
'2 J.L. Querner Truck Lines, Inc. v. Safeway Trucklines, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 554, 561,
168 A.2d 216, 220 (1961).
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The formulation of the "whose business" test is generally cred-
ited to Justice Moody's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson.63
After hypothesizing two cases, one in which the liability would rest
with the general employer and one in which it would rest with the
special employer, Justice Moody stated the test as follows:
To determine whether a given case falls within one class or the
other, we must inquire whose is the work being performed, a ques-
tion which is usually answered by ascertaining who has the power
to control and direct the servants in the performance of their work.64
Applying this test, the Court concluded that Standard Oil's winch-
man was not subject to the control of the stevedores he was assisting
and therefore was not doing their work. Thus Standard Oil, not the
stevedores when a load was lowered before the proper signal had been
given, was liable for the injury sustained by another stevedore.
The "whose business" test was used by the Ohio Supreme Court
in two cases in the 1940's and by the Eighth District Court of Appeals
(Cuyahoga County) in two cases in the 1950's. Perhaps the most
concise statement of the test as used in Ohio is that found in Halkias
v. Wilkoff Co.:
When one party loans his servant to another for a particular em-
ployment in the business and under the direction of the latter, the
servant, for anything done in that employment, must be regarded
as the servant of the party to whom he is loaned, although he
remains the general servant of the party who loaned him.65
This formulation of the test, like the Standard Oil formulation, has
two elements: a "control" element, which the Halkias court calls
"direction," and a "business" element. It is unfortunate that the later
Ohio cases attempting to apply the "whose business" test did not
adhere more closely to the Halkias formulation. Its language all but
avoids the three conceptual problems encountered in using the test.
The first of these problems concerns the proper role to be played
by the "control" or "direction" element of the test. The language of
the Standard Oil formulation seems to indicate that control is not
itself the test, but only a major factor in determining whose is the
business. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have put the
212 U.S. 215 (1909).
" Id. at 221-22.
141 Ohio St. 139, 47 N.E.2d 199, 200 (1943)(paragraph 4 of syllabus). The statement
that the servant remains in the employ of the general employer does not seem to be supported
in the opinion. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
NOTES
issue in its proper perspective when it stated that "the question of the
power to control the work is of great importance . . . but is not
conclusive." 6 The Halkias version of the test seems to follow this
spirit. By conjoining the "business" and "control" elements, the lan-
guage of the court indicates, at least grammatically, that the "con-
trol" element is essential, but not decisive. Two of the other Ohio
"whose business" cases also adopt the conjunctive technique, 7 while
a third, Scharf v. Gardner Cartage Co., strays slightly from the
pattern by using "and further" to join the "business" and "control"
elements.68
The second conceptual problem in working with the "whose
business" test is defining "control," as used in this test. There is a
great risk that the word will be used in the same sense as in the
control test - i.e., spot control.69 The appropriate standard, however,
seems to require less specificity than spot control, yet somewhat more
detail than broad control. This intermediate degree of control might
be called "project control."
The identity of the person who, in fact, directs the details of the
work and gives the immediate instructions to the workmen is of
comparatively small importance, the power of control referred to
being the power to control the undertaking as a whole.7
The Ohio Supreme Court appears to have embraced the "project
control" standard in its "whose business" decisions. Indeed, it does
not use the term "control" at all; rather, it has used less confusing
designations such as "direction"' or "supervise and direct. 712 More-
over, the conspicuous absence of the "manner or means" language
used in conjunction with these terms in the control test would seem
to indicate that the terms are being used in a different sense in the
"whose business" test.
The court of appeals has not been as precise in its language. In
Scharf v. Gardner Cartage Co. the court speaks of "direction or
control. . . in the manner or way in which the work. . . was to be
66 Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255, 263 (10th Cir. 1937).
Giovinale v. Republic Steel Corp., 151 Ohio St. 161, 169, 84 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1949)
(quoting paragraph 4 of the Halkias syllabus); Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., 102 Ohio
App. 163, 169, 131 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1956) ("under the control of the defendant and doing its
work").
" 95 Ohio App. 153, 159, 113 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1953).
* See text at III.A.2 supra.
Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255, 263 (10th Cir. 1937).
" Halkias v. Wilkoff Co., 141 Ohio St. 139, 152, 47 N.E.2d 199, 205 (1943).
7 Giovinale v. Republic Steel Corp., 151 Ohio St. 161, 170, 84 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1949)
(quoting from the dissenting opinion below).
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 681 (1975)
done or accomplished. '7 3 Were it not for the later inclusion of a
"business" element, one might think that this was the control test,
rather than merely the "control" element of the "whose business"
test. Similarly, in Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., in deciding the
question of whether Republic's crane operator was loaned to a sub-
contractor, the court points out the fact that the subcontractor "had
no right to control him in the manner in which he operated the
crane." 74 The use of "control" and "manner" here seems more indic-
ative of the spot control standard than the "project control" standard
apparent in Halkias.
The final and most difficult problem in using the "whose busi-
ness" test is determining the limits of the business of each employer.
In other words, how can it be determined whose business it is that
the employee is doing? Even when the ordinary business activities of
the general and the special employer are substantially dissimilar, the
reimbursements and rentals received by the general employer for the
use of his machines and employees give him a substantial economic
interest in the special employer's work. 75 Moreover, it could be said
that, because men and equipment not normally employed by the
special employer must be brought in to perform a particular task, the
doing of that task is not a part of the special employer's business
operations. 6 On the other hand, employees might be borrowed to do
work normally done by general employees of the special employer
who, for one reason or another, are not available to do the job at the
time. Finally, the cost to the special employer may be less if he rents
machines and operators rather than buying the machines and keeping
the operators on the payroll full-time.
The problem of adequately defining the "business" element
should be resolved in light of the goal of choosing the better loss
distributor. Under the entrepreneur theory of vicarious liability, the
business is that of the employer who seeks to profit from the resulting
product; he is the one who will be better able to distribute losses to
society through the price charged for the product. Moreover, it is this
same employer who will possess the "project control," inasmuch as
he is the one ultimately responsible for the product.7
7a 95 Ohio App. 153, 159, 113 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1953).
" 102 Ohio App. 163, 171, 131 N.E.2d 593, 598 (1956).
71 See, MECHEM, supra note 1, at 315; Comment, Workman's Compensation: Liability oj
General and Special Employers, 26 CAL. L. REV. 370 (1938).
78 MECHEM, supra note 1, at 315.
1 Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
1239-40 (1940).
NOTES
The factors examined by the Ohio courts in applying the "whose
business" test appear to be those that indicate who will profit from
the product itself, rather than who will profit from the provision of
labor to produce the product. In Halkias the determinant question
was whether the work was being done "in the ordinary course of
business" of the employer, indicating that liability would attach to
the employer if the activity of the employee was part of the normal
profit-making scheme of the employer in question.78 On occasion, a
contract between the special and general employers, delineating the
tasks to be performed by each, has been used to resolve the question
of whose is the business.79 Finally, in the case of equipment leased to
the special employer that is to be operated by the lessor's employee,
it has been recognized that the lessor will profit only from the provi-
sion of labor and equipment, and not from the product of that labor
and equipment; consequently, the work is not the lessor's."
While the "whole business" test has generally been well re-
garded as both an efficient loss distribution mechanism8 and as a loss
preventor, 2 it has suffered some criticism. Because of the different
use of the "control" idea and confusion surrounding the proper defi-
nition of the "business" element, the "whose business" test is, per-
haps, even more ambiguous than the "control" test.83 The test has
also come in for criticism because of the results it produces; the vast
majority of instances in which the "whose business" test has been
applied have resulted in liability for the short term employer. One
student states that it is "the rationalization of a result and not a
test."84 Other commentators defend the results of the test by observ-
ing that special employer liability is favored, because the special
employer is in a better loss-bearing position."
71 141 Ohio St. 139, 153, 47 N.E.2d 199, 206 (1943). This seems to go a long way toward
the "scope of the business" standard suggested in Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed
Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REv. 122, 1249 (1940).
If the act in question is within the scope of the business, within its normal sphere of
operations, within the boundaries reasonably fixed by the usual conduct of similar
enterprises, liability should normally follow.
19 Giovinale v. Republic Steel Corp., 151 Ohio St. 161, 169, 84 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1949);
Redmond v. Republic Steel Corp., 102 Ohio App. 163, 169, 131 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1956).
91 Scharf v. Gardner Cartage Co., 95 Ohio App. 153, 159, 113 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1953).
81 Douglas, supra note 24, at 601-04; Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444,
461 (1923).
u Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1222,
1232 (1940); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444, 455 (1923).
3 Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REv. 1222,
1239-40 (1940).
"1 Borrowed Servants, supra note 2, at 314.
Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1222,
1233-39 (1940).
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IV. Conclusion
In Ohio, as elsewhere, the courts seem to have lost sight of the
purpose of the loaned servant doctrine. The decisions have too often
indicated a preoccupation with finding a single master for the em-
ployee, rather than recognizing the task to be one of choosing be-
tween masters. There are, however, some hints in the most recent
decisions that the supreme court, at least, has adopted the dual mas-
ter theory and may begin to put the doctrine to its proper use.
Even if the courts recognize that the aim of the doctrine should
be to find the better of two loss distributors, there is considerable
doubt that they will be able to effectively implement that goal. Both
of the tests used to fix liability in the loaned servant situation are
fraught with definitional problems that have been only partially re-
solved. Moreover, while the "whose business" test appears to be
better situated to rationally determine loss distributing ability, the
more recent decisions, both from the supreme court and the courts
of appeals, seem to indicate that, after a brief period of use, the
"whose business" test has been abandoned in favor of the less effica-
cious control test. Hopefully, a renaissance of the "whose business"
test will not be long in coming.
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